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Abstract
The following zero-sum game between nature and a statistician blends Bayesian
methods with frequentist methods such as p-values and confidence intervals.
Nature chooses a posterior distribution consistent with a set of possible priors.
At the same time, the statistician selects a parameter distribution for inference
with the goal of maximizing the minimum Kullback-Leibler information gained
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over a confidence distribution or other benchmark distribution. An application
to testing a simple null hypothesis leads the statistician to report a posterior
probability of the hypothesis that is informed by both Bayesian and frequentist
methodology, each weighted according how well the prior is known.
As is generally acknowledged, the Bayesian approach is ideal given knowl-
edge of a prior distribution that can be interpreted in terms of relative fre-
quencies. On the other hand, frequentist methods such as confidence intervals
and p-values have the advantage that they perform well without knowledge of
such a distribution of the parameters. Since neither the Bayesian approach
nor the frequentist approach is entirely satisfactory in situations involving par-
tial knowledge of the prior distribution, the proposed procedure reduces to a
Bayesian method given complete knowledge of the prior, to a frequentist method
given complete ignorance about the prior, and to a blend between the two meth-
ods given partial knowledge of the prior. The blended approach resembles the
Bayesian method rather than the frequentist method to the precise extent that
the prior is known.
The problem of testing a point null hypothesis illustrates the proposed frame-
work. The blended probability that the null hypothesis is true is equal to the p-
value or a lower bound of an unknown Bayesian posterior probability, whichever
is greater. Thus, given total ignorance represented by a lower bound of 0, the
p-value is used instead of any Bayesian posterior probability. At the opposite
extreme of a known prior, the p-value is ignored. In the intermediate case,
the possible Bayesian posterior probability that is closest to the p-value is used
for inference. Thus, both the Bayesian method and the frequentist method
influence the inferences made.
Keywords: blended inference; confidence distribution; confidence posterior; hybrid
inference; maximum entropy; maxmin expected utility; minimum cross entropy; mini-
mum divergence; minimum information for discrimination; minimum relative entropy;
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observed confidence level; robust Bayesian analysis
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Various compromises between Bayesian and frequentist approaches to statistical infer-
ence represent first attempts to combining attractive aspects of each approach (Good,
1983). While the more recent the hybrid inference approach of Yuan (2009) succeeded
in leveraging Bayesian point estimators with maximum likelihood estimates, reducing
to the former or the latter in the presence or absence of a reliably estimated prior on
all parameters, how to extend the theory beyond point estimation is not yet clear.
Further, hybrid inference in its current form does not cover the case of a parameter
of interest that has a partially known prior. Since such partial knowledge of a prior
occurs in many scientific inference situations, it calls for a theoretical framework for
method development that appropriately blends Bayesian and frequentist methods.
Ideally, blended inference would meet these criteria:
1. Complete knowledge of the prior. If the prior is known, the corresponding
posterior is used for inference. Among statisticians, this principle is almost
universally acknowledged. However, it is rarely the case of the prior is known
for all practical purposes.
2. Negligible knowledge of the prior. If there is no reliable knowledge of a
prior, inference is based on methods that do not require such knowledge. This
principle motivates not only the development of confidence intervals and p-
values but also Bayesian posteriors derived from improper and data-dependent
priors. Accordingly, blended inference must allow the use of such methods when
applicable.
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3. Continuum between extremes. Inference relies on the prior to the extent
that it is known while relying on the other methods to the extent that it is
not known. Thus, there is a gradation of methodology between the above two
extremes. The premise of this paper is that this intermediate scenario calls
for a careful balance between pure Bayesian methods on one hand and impure
Bayesian or non-Bayesian methods on the other hand.
Instead of framing the knowledge of a prior in terms of confidence intervals, as in
pure empirical Bayes approaches, it will be framed more generally herein in terms of
a set of plausible priors, as in interval probability (Weichselberger, 2000; Augustin,
2002, 2004) and robust Bayesian (Berger, 1984) approaches. Whereas the concept
of an unknown prior cannot arise in strict Bayesian statistics, it does arise in robust
Bayesian statistics when the levels of belief of an intelligent agent have not been fully
assessed (Berger, 1984). Unknown priors also occur in many more objective contexts
involving purely frequentist interpretations of probability in terms of variability in the
observable world rather than the uncertainty in the mind of an agent. For example,
frequency-based priors are routinely estimated under random effects and empirical
Bayes models; see, e.g., Efron (2010). (Remark 1 comments further on interpretations
of probability and relaxes the convenient assumption of a true prior.)
With respect to the problem at hand, the most relevant robust Bayesian ap-
proaches are the minimax Bayes risk (“Γ-minimax”) practice of minimizing the max-
imum Bayes risk (Robbins, 1951; Berger, 1985; Vidakovic, 2000) and the maxmin
expected utility (“conditional Γ-minimax”) practice of maximizing the minimum pos-
terior expected payoff or, equivalently, minimizing the maximum posterior expected
loss (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; DasGupta and Studden, 1989; Vidakovic, 2000;
Augustin, 2002, 2004). Augustin (2004) reviews both methods in terms of inter-
val probabilities that need not be subjective. With typical loss functions, the for-
mer method meets the above criteria for classical minimax alternatives to Bayesian
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methods but does not apply to other attractive alternatives. For example, several
confidence intervals, p-values, and objective-Bayes posteriors routinely used in bio-
statistics are not minimax optimal. (Fraser and Reid (1990) and Fraser (2004) argued
that requiring the optimality of frequentist procedures can lead to trade-offs between
hypothetical samples that potentially mislead scientists or yield pathological proce-
dures.) Optimality in the classical sense is not required of the alternative procedures
under the framework outlined below, which can be understood in terms of maxmin
expected utility with a payoff function that incorporates the alternative procedures
to be used as a benchmark for the Bayesian posteriors.
1.2 Heuristic overview
To define a general theory of blended inference that meets a formal statement of the
three criteria, Section 2 introduces a variation of a zero-sum game of Topsøe (1979),
Harremoës and Topsøe (2001), and Topsøe (2007). (The discrete version of the game
also appeared in Pfaffelhuber (1977), and Grünwald and Philip Dawid (2004) inter-
preted it as a special case of the maxmin expected utility problem.) The “nature”
opponent selects a prior consistent with the available knowledge as the “statistician”
player selects a posterior distribution with the aim of maximizing the minimum infor-
mation gained relative to one or more alternative methods. Such benchmark methods
may be confidence interval procedures, frequentist hypothesis tests, or other tech-
niques that are not necessarily Bayesian.
From that theory, Section 3 derives a widely applicable framework for testing
hypotheses. For concreteness, the motivating results are heuristically summarized
here. Consider the problem of testing H0 : θ∗ = 0, the hypothesis that a real-valued
parameter θ∗ of interest is equal to the point 0 on the real line R. The observed data
vector x is modeled as a realization of a random variable denoted by X. Let p (x)
denote the p-value resulting from a statistical test.
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It has long been recognized that the p-value for a simple (point) null hypothesis is
often smaller than Bayesian posterior probabilities of the hypothesis (Lindley, 1957;
Berger and Sellke, 1987). Suppose θ∗ has an unknown prior distribution according to
which the prior probability of H0 is pi0. While pi0 is unknown, it is assumed to be no
less than some known lower bound denoted by pi0.
Following the methodology of Berger et al. (1994), Sellke et al. (2001) found a
generally applicable lower bound on the Bayes factor. As Section 3.1 will explain,
that bound immediately leads to
Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) =
(
1−
(
1− pi0
pi0ep (x) log p (x)
))−1
(1)
as a lower bound on the unknown posterior probability of the null hypothesis for
p (x) < 1/e and to pi0 as a lower bound on the probability if p (x) ≥ 1/e.
In addition to Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) , the unknown Bayesian posterior probability
of H0, there is a frequentist posterior probability of H0 that will guide selection of a
posterior probability for inference based on pi0 ≥ pi0 and other constraints summarized
by Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) ≥ Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)). While it is incorrect to interpret
the p-value p (x) as a Bayesian probability, it will be seen in Section 3.2 that p (x) is
a confidence posterior probability that H0 is true.
With the confidence posterior as the benchmark, the solution to the optimization
problem described above gives the blended posterior probability that the null hypoth-
esis is true. It is simply the maximum of the p-value and the lower bound on the
Bayesian posterior probability:
Pr (H0; p (x)) = p (x) ∨ Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) . (2)
By plotting Pr (H0; p (x)) as a function of p (x) and pi0, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate each
of the above criteria for blended inference:
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1. Complete knowledge of the prior. In this example, the prior is only known
when pi0 = 1, in which case
Pr (H0; p (x)) = Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) = 1
for all p (x). Thus, the p-value is ignored in the presence of a known prior.
2. Negligible knowledge of the prior. There is no knowledge of the prior when
pi0 = 0 and negligible knowledge when pi0 is so low that Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) ≤
p (x). In such cases, Pr (H0; p (x)) = p (x), and the Bayesian posteriors are
ignored.
3. Continuum between extremes. When pi0 is of intermediate value in the
sense that Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) is exclusively between p (x) and 1,
Pr (H0; p (x)) = Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) < 1.
Consequently, Pr (H0; p (x)) increases gradually from p (x) to 1 as pi0 increases
(Figures 1 and 2). In this case, the blended posterior lies in the set of allowed
Bayesian posteriors but is on the boundary of that set that is the closest to
the p-value. Thus, both the p-value and the Bayesian posteriors influence the
blended posterior and thus the inferences made on its basis.
The plotted parameter distribution will be presented in Section 3.3 as a widely ap-
plicable blended posterior.
Finally, Section 4 offers additional details and generalizations in a series of re-
marks.
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Figure 1: Blended posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true versus the
p-value. The curves correspond to lower bounds of prior probabilities ranging in 5%
increments from 0% on the bottom to 100% on the top.
8
Figure 2: Blended posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true versus the
p-value and the lower bound of the prior probability that the null hypothesis is true.
The top plot displays the full domain, half of which is shown in the bottom plot.
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2 General theory
2.1 Preliminary notation and definitions
Denote the observed data set, typically a vector or matrix of observations, by x, a
member of a set X that is endowed with a σ-algebra X. The value of x determines
two sets of posterior distributions that can be blended for inference about the value
of a target parameter. Much of the following notation is needed to transform general
Bayesian posteriors and confidence posteriors or other benchmark posteriors such
that they are defined on the same measurable space, that of the target parameter.
(A confidence posterior, to be defined in Section 3.2.1, is a parameter distribution
from which confidence intervals and p-values may be extracted. As such, it facilitates
blending typical frequentist procedures with Bayesian procedures.)
2.1.1 Bayesian posteriors
With some measurable space
(
Θ˙∗, A˙∗
)
for parameter values in Θ˙∗, let Pprior∗ denote
a set of probability distributions on
(
X × Θ˙∗,X⊗ A˙∗
)
. Any distribution in Pprior∗ is
called a prior (distribution), understood in the broad sense of a model that includes
the possible likelihood functions as well as the parameter distribution. It encodes the
constraints and other information available about the parameter before observing x.
On the other hand, any distribution of a parameter is called a posterior (distribu-
tion) if it depends on x. For some P prior∗ ∈ Pprior∗ , an example of a posterior distribu-
tion on
(
Θ˙∗, A˙∗
)
is P˙∗ = P prior∗ (•|X = x), where X is a random variable of a distri-
bution on (X ,X) that is determined by P prior∗ . P˙∗ is called a Bayesian posterior (dis-
tribution) since it is equal to a conditional distribution of the parameter given X = x.
Adapting an apt term from Topsøe (2007), the set P˙∗ =
{
P prior∗ (•|X = x) : P prior∗ ∈ Pprior∗
}
of Bayesian posteriors on
(
Θ˙∗, A˙∗
)
may be considered the “knowledge base.” For a
set Θ˙, if τ˙ : Θ˙∗ → Θ is an A˙∗-measurable map and if θ˙∗ has distribution P˙∗ ∈ P˙∗,
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then θ˙ = τ˙
(
θ˙∗
)
, referred to as an inferential target of P˙∗, has induced probability
space
(
Θ,A, P˙
)
. The set
P˙ =
{
P˙ : τ˙
(
θ˙∗
)
∼ P˙ , θ˙∗ ∼ P˙∗ ∈ P˙∗
}
of all distributions thereby induced and the set P of all probability distributions on
(Θ,A) are related by P˙ ⊆ P .
Example 1. In the hypothesis test of Section 1.2, θ˙ = 0 if the null hypothesis that
θ˙∗ = 0 is true and θ˙ = 1 if the alternative hypothesis that θ˙∗ 6= 0 is true, where
θ˙∗ and θ˙ are random variables with distributions respectively defined on the Borel
space (R,B (R)) and the discrete space ({0, 1} , 2{0,1}), where 2{0,1} is the power set
of {0, 1}. Thus, in this case, τ˙ is the indicator function 1(−∞,0)∪(0,∞) : R → {0, 1},
yielding θ˙ = 1(−∞,0)∪(0,∞)
(
θ˙∗
)
. Section 3 considers this example in more detail.
A function that transforms a set of parameter distributions to a single parameter
distribution on the same measurable space is called an inference process (Paris, 1994;
Paris and Vencovská, 1997). The resulting distribution is known as a “representation”
(Augustin, 2002) or “reduction” (Bickel, 2011a) of the set. Perhaps the best known
inference process for a discrete parameter set Θ is that of the maximum entropy
principle, which would select a member of P˙ such that it has higher entropy than
any other member of the set (see Remark 2). This paper will propose a wide class of
inference processes such that each transforms P˙ to a member of P on the basis the
following concept of a benchmark distribution on (Θ,A).
2.1.2 Benchmark posteriors
For the convenience of the reader, the same Latin and Greek letters will be used for the
set of posteriors that will represent a gold standard or benchmark method of inference
as for the Bayesian posteriors of Section 2.1.1, with the double-dot •¨ replacing the
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single-dot •˙. Let P¨∗ represent a set of posterior distributions on some measurable
space
(
Θ¨∗, A¨∗
)
, and let P¨∗ represent a set of such sets. For instance, considering any
P¨∗ in P¨∗, P¨∗ may be a confidence posterior (a fiducial-like distribution to be defined
precisely in Section 3.2), a generalized fiducial posterior of Hannig (2009), or even a
Bayesian posterior based on an improper prior. (In the first case, nested confidence
intervals with inexact coverage rates generate a set P¨∗ of multiple confidence posteriors
rather than the single confidence posterior that is generated by exact confidence
intervals (Bickel, 2011a).) Suppose there exists a function τ¨ : P¨∗ → Θ such that P¨ ,
the probability distribution of τ¨
(
P¨∗
)
, is defined on (Θ,A). P¨ is called the benchmark
posterior (distribution), and θ¨ = τ¨
(
P¨∗
)
is the inferential target of P¨∗. It follows that
P¨ is in P but not necessarily in P˙ .
Example 2. Consider a model in which the full parameter θ˙∗ ∈ Θ˙∗ consists of an
interest parameter θ˙ and a nuisance parameter λ˙. The measurable space of θ˙∗ =〈
θ˙, λ˙
〉
is denoted by
(
Θ˙∗, A˙∗
)
, and that of θ˙ by (Θ,A). Suppose that a set of
Bayesian posteriors is available for θ˙∗ but that nested confidence intervals are only
available for an unknown parameter θ ∈ Θ. It follows that a confidence posterior
P¨ is available on (Θ,A) but not on
(
Θ˙∗, A˙∗
)
. Then the framework of this section
can be applied by using the function τ˙ such that θ = τ˙
(
θ˙∗
)
in order to project the
Bayesian posteriors onto (Θ,A), the measurable space on which P¨ is defined. In this
case, since there is only one possible benchmark posterior, the function τ¨ need not
be explicitly constructed.
The function τ¨ allows consideration of a set of possible benchmark posteriors by
transforming it to a single benchmark posterior defined on (Θ,A), the same measur-
able space as the above Bayesian posteriors of θ˙. Since that function is unusual, two
ways to compose it will now be explained.
Example 3. Consider the inference process Π¨ : P¨∗ → P∗, where P∗ is the set of
all probability distributions on
(
Θ¨∗, A¨∗
)
. Define the random variable θ¨∗ to have
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distribution Π¨
(
P¨∗
)
(•) = Π¨
(
P¨∗
)
. If τ¨ : Θ¨∗ → Θ is an A¨∗-measurable function, then
θ¨ = τ¨
(
θ¨∗
)
is the inferential target of P¨∗. Further, the distribution P¨ of θ¨ is the
benchmark posterior.
Example 4. Whereas Example 3 applied an inference process before a parameter
transformation, this example reverses the order by first applying τ¨ . Let P¨ denote the
subset of P consisting of all distributions of the parameters transformed by τ¨ :
P¨ =
{
P : τ¨
(
θ¨∗
)
∼ P, θ¨∗ ∼ P¨∗ ∈ P¨∗
}
.
Then an inference process transforms P¨ to the benchmark posterior P¨ , which in turn
is the distribution of θ¨, the inferential target of P¨∗.
2.2 Blended inference
In terms of Radon-Nikodym differentiation, the information divergence of P with
respect to Q on (Θ,A) is
I (P ||Q) =
∫
dP log
(
dP
dQ
)
(3)
if P  Q and I (P ||Q) = ∞ otherwise. I (P ||Q) is also known as cross/relative en-
tropy, I-divergence, information for discrimination, and Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Other measures of information may also be used (Remark 3). For any posteriors
P˙ ∈ P˙ and Q ∈ P , the inferential gain I
(
P˙ ||P¨  Q
)
of Q relative to P¨ given P˙ is
the amount of information gained by making inferences on the basis of Q instead of
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the benchmark posterior P¨ :
I
(
P˙ ||P¨  Q
)
= I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
− I
(
P˙ ||Q
)
.
Let P˙
(
P¨
)
denote the largest subset of P˙ such that the information divergence of
any of its members with respect to P¨ is finite. That is,
P˙
(
P¨
)
=
{
P˙ ∈ P˙ : I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
<∞
}
, (4)
which is nonempty by assumption. (The assumption is not necessary under the
generalization described in Remark 4.)
The blended posterior (distribution) Pˆ is the probability distribution on (Θ,A)
that maximizes the inferential gain relative to the benchmark posterior given the
worst-case posterior restricted by the constraints that defined P˙ and P˙
(
P¨
)
:
inf
P˙∈P˙(P¨)
I
(
P˙ ||P¨  Pˆ
)
= sup
Q∈P
inf
P˙∈P˙(P¨)
I
(
P˙ ||P¨  Q
)
, (5)
where the supremum and infinum over any set including an indeterminate number
are ∞ and −∞, respectively (Topsøe, 2007). Inferences based on Pˆ are blended in
the sense that they depend on both P˙ and P¨ in the ways to be specified in Section
2.3.
The main result of Theorem 2 of Topsøe (2007) gives a simply stated solution of
the optimality problem of equation (5) under broad conditions.
Proposition 1. If I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
<∞ for some P˙ ∈ P˙ and if P˙
(
P¨
)
is convex, then the
blended posterior Pˆ is the probability distribution in P˙ that minimizes the information
divergence with respect to the benchmark posterior:
I
(
Pˆ ||P¨
)
= inf
P˙∈P˙(P¨)
I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
. (6)
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Proof. Topsøe (2007) proved the result from inequalities of information theory given
the additional stated condition of his Theorem 2 that I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
< ∞ for all P˙ ∈
P˙
(
P¨
)
. (See Remark 4.) The condition that I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
<∞ for some P˙ ∈ P˙ and the
above definition of P˙
(
P¨
)
ensure that the condition is met.
Alternatively, the minimization of information divergence may define Pˆ rather
than result from its definition in terms of the game (Remark 5).
2.3 Properties of blended inference
The desiderata of Section 1 for blended inference can now be formalized. A posterior
distribution P˜
(
•; P˙ , P¨
)
on (Θ,A) is said to blend the set P˙ of Bayesian posteriors
with the benchmark posterior P¨ for inference about the parameter in Θ provided that
P˜
(
•; P˙ , P¨
)
satisfies the following criteria under the conditions of Proposition 1:
1. Complete knowledge of the prior. If P˙ has a single member P˙ , then
P˜
(
•; P˙ , P¨
)
= P˙ .
2. Negligible knowledge of the prior. If P¨ ∈ P˙ and if P˙ has at least two
members, then P˜
(
•; P˙ , P¨
)
= P¨ .
3. Continuum between extremes. For any D ≥ 0 and any P? ⊆ P such that
sup
P∈P?,P˙∈P˙(P¨)
∣∣∣I (P ||P¨)− I (P˙ ||P¨)∣∣∣ ≤ D (7)
and such that P˙
(
P¨
)
∪ P? is convex,
∣∣∣I (P˜ (•; P˙ ∪ P?, P¨) ||P¨)− I (P˜ (•; P˙ , P¨) ||P¨)∣∣∣ ≤ D. (8)
Theorem 1. The blended posterior Pˆ blends the set P˙ of Bayesian posteriors with
the benchmark posterior P¨ for inference about the parameter in Θ.
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Proof. Since the criteria are only required under the conditions of Proposition 1, it will
suffice to prove that the criteria follow from equation (6). If P˙ has a single member
P˙ , then equation (6) implies that Pˆ = P˙ , thereby ensuring Criterion 1. Similarly,
if P¨ ∈ P˙ , then equation (6) implies that Pˆ = P¨ , thus proving that Criterion 2 is
met. Assume, contrary to Criterion 3, that there exist a D ≥ 0 and a P? ⊆ P
such that P˙
(
P¨
)
∪ P? is convex, equation (7) is true, and equation (8) is false with
P˜
(
•; P˙ ∪ P?, P¨
)
and P˜
(
•; P˙ , P¨
)
equal to the blended posteriors respectively using
P˙ ∪P? and P˙ as the sets of Bayesian posteriors. Then equation (6) can be written as
I
(
P˜
(
•; P˙ ∪ P?, P¨
)
||P¨
)
= inf
P˙∈P˙(P¨)∪P?
I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
;
I
(
P˜
(
•; P˙ , P¨
)
||P¨
)
= inf
P˙∈P˙(P¨)
I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
.
Hence, with a ∧ b signifying the minimum of a and b,
∣∣∣I (P˜ (•; P˙ ∪ P?, P¨) ||P¨)− I (P˜ (•; P˙ , P¨) ||P¨)∣∣∣ =
inf
P˙∈P˙(P¨)
I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
− inf
P˙∈P˙(P¨)
I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
∧ inf
P∈P?
I
(
P ||P¨
)
,
which cannot exceed inf P˙∈P˙(P¨) I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
− infP∈P? I
(
P ||P¨
)
and thus, according to
equation (7), cannot exceed D. Therefore, the above assumption that equation (8) is
false is contradicted, thereby establishing satisfaction of Criterion 3.
Example 5. Suppose the set of possible priors consists of a single frequency-matching
prior, i.e., a prior that leads to 95% posterior credible intervals that are equal to 95%
confidence intervals, etc. If the benchmark posterior is the confidence posterior that
yields the same confidence intervals, then it is the Bayesian posterior distribution
corresponding to the prior. In that case, the blended distribution is equal to that
Bayesian/confidence posterior. Thus, the first condition of blended inference applies.
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The second condition would instead apply if the set of possible priors contained at
least one other prior in addition to the frequency-matching prior.
Criterion 3 is much stronger than the heuristic idea of continuity introduced in Sec-
tion 1.1. Its use of information divergence can be generalized to other measures of
divergence (Remark 3).
3 Blended hypothesis testing
A fertile field of application for the theory of Section 2 is that of testing hypotheses,
as outlined in Section 1.2. Building on Example 1, this section provides methodology
for a wide class of models used in hypothesis testing.
3.1 A bound on the Bayesian posterior
Defining that class in terms of the concepts of Section 2.1.1 requires additional no-
tation. For a continuous sample space X and a function p : X → [0, 1] such that
p (X) ∼ U (0, 1) under a null hypothesis, each p (x) for any x ∈ X will be called a p-
value. Using some dominating measure, let f0 and f1 denote probability density func-
tions of p (X) under the null hypothesis
(
θ˙ = 0
)
and under the alternative hypothesis(
θ˙ = 1
)
, respectively. For the observed x, the likelihood ratio f0 (p (x)) /f1 (p (x)) is
called the Bayes factor since, for a prior distribution P prior∗ , Bayes’s theorem gives
ϕ (p (x))
1− ϕ (p (x)) =
P prior∗
(
θ˙ = 0
)
P prior∗
(
θ˙ = 1
) f0 (p (x))
f1 (p (x))
, (9)
where ϕ (p (x)) = P prior∗
(
θ˙ = 0|p (X) = p (x)
)
. Here, as ϕ (p (x)) is a local false dis-
covery rate (LFDR), the letter ϕ abbreviates “false” (Efron, 2010; Bickel, 2011c).
In a parametric setting, f1 (p (x)) would be the likelihood integrated over the prior
distribution conditional on the alternative hypothesis.
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Let κ : X → R denote the function defined by the transformation κ (x) =
− log p (x) for all x ∈ X . Then a probability density of κ (X) under the null hy-
pothesis is the standard exponential density g0 (κ (x)) = e−κ(x). Assume that, un-
der the alternative hypothesis
(
θ˙ = 1
)
, κ (X) admits a density function g1 with re-
spect to the same dominating measure as g0. It follows that g0 (κ (x)) /g1 (κ (x)) =
f0 (p (x)) /f1 (p (x)). The hazard rate h1 (κ (x)) under the alternative is defined by
h1 (κ (x)) = g1 (κ (x)) /
∫∞
κ(x)
g1 (k) dk for all x ∈ X , and h1 : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) is called
the hazard rate function.
Sellke et al. (2001) obtained the following lower bound b (p (x)) of the Bayes factor
b (x).
Lemma 1. If h1 is nonincreasing, then, for all x ∈ X ,
b (p (x)) =
f0 (p (x))
f1 (p (x))
≥ b (p (x)) =

−ep (x) log p (x) if p (x) < 1/e;
1 if p (x) ≥ 1/e.
(10)
The condition on the hazard rate defines a wide class of models that is useful for
testing simple null hypotheses. A broad subclass will now be defined by imposing
constraints on pi0 = P prior∗
(
θ˙ = 0
)
, the prior probability that the null hypothesis
is true, in addition to the hazard rate condition. Specifically, pi0 is known to have
pi0 ∈ [0, 1] as a lower bound. Thus, rearranging equation (9) as
ϕ (p (x)) =
(
1 +
(
1− pi0
pi0b0 (p (x))
))−1
,
a lower bound on ϕ (p (x)) is
Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) = ϕ (p (x)) =
(
1 +
(
1− pi0
pi0b (p (x))
))−1
,
leading to equation (1).
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Let P consist of all probability distributions on (Θ,A) = ({0, 1} , 2{0,1}). The
subset P˙ consists of all P˙ ∈ P such that P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
≥ ϕ (p (x)).
3.2 A confidence benchmark posterior
3.2.1 Confidence posterior theory
The following parametric framework facilitates the application of Section 2.1.2 to
hypothesis testing. The observation x is an outcome of the random variable X¨ of
probability space (X ,X, Pθ∗,λ∗), where the interest parameter θ∗ ∈ Θ¨∗ and a nuisance
parameter λ∗ (in some set Λ¨∗) are unknown. Let S : Θ¨∗×X → [0, 1] and t : X ×Θ¨∗ →
R denote functions such that S (•;x) is a distribution function, S (θ∗;X) ∼ U (0, 1),
and
S (θ∗;x) = Pθ∗,λ∗
(
t
(
X¨; θ∗
)
≥ t (x; θ∗)
)
for all x ∈ X , θ∗ ∈ Θ¨∗, and λ∗ ∈ Λ¨∗. S is known as a significance function, and t as
a pivot or test statistic. It follows that p (x) = S (0;x) is a p-value for testing the
hypothesis that θ∗ = 0 and that [S−1 (α;X) , S−1 (β;X)] is a (β − α) 100% confidence
interval for θ∗ given any α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [α, 1]. Thus, whether a significance
function is found from p-values over a set of simple null hypotheses or instead from a
set of nested confidence intervals, it contains the information needed to derive either
(Schweder and Hjort, 2002; Singh et al., 2007; Bickel, 2011a,b).
Let θ¨∗ denote the random variable of the probability measure P¨∗ that has S (•;x) as
its distribution function. In other words, P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ ≤ θ∗
)
= S (θ∗;x) for all θ∗ ∈ Θ¨∗. P¨∗
is called a confidence posterior (distribution) since it equates the frequentist coverage
rate of a confidence interval with the probability that the parameter lies in the fixed,
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observed confidence interval:
β − α = Pθ∗,λ∗
(
θ∗ ∈
[
S−1 (α;X) , S−1 (β;X)
])
= P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ ∈
[
S−1 (α;x) , S−1 (β;x)
])
for all x ∈ X , θ∗ ∈ Θ¨∗, and λ∗ ∈ Λ¨∗. The term “confidence posterior” (Bickel,
2011a,b) is preferred here over the usual term “confidence distribution” (Schweder and
Hjort, 2002) to emphasize its use as an alternative to Bayesian posterior distributions.
Polansky (2007), Singh et al. (2007), and Bickel (2011a) provide generalizations to
vector parameters of interest. Extensions based on multiple comparison procedures
are sketched in Remark 6.
3.2.2 A confidence posterior for testing
For the application to two-sided testing of a simple null hypothesis, let θ∗ = |θ∗∗|,
the absolute value of a real parameter θ∗∗ of interest, leading to Θ¨∗ = [0,∞). Then
p (x) = S (0;x) is equivalent to a two-tailed p-value for testing the hypothesis that
θ∗∗ = 0. Since P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ ≤ 0
)
= S (0;x) and since P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ ≤ 0
)
= P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ = 0
)
, it follows
that p (x) = P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ = 0
)
, i.e., the p-value is equal to the probability that the mull
hypothesis is true.
If P¨∗ is the only confidence posterior under consideration, then P¨∗ =
{
P¨∗
}
, and
there is no need for an inference process. Following the terminology of Example 3,
τ¨ : Θ¨∗ → Θ is defined by τ¨
(
θ¨∗
)
= 1(0,∞)
(
θ¨∗
)
. By implication, θ¨ = 0 if θ¨∗ = 0 and
θ¨ = 1 if θ¨∗ > 0. Thus, p (x) = P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ = 0
)
ensures that P¨
(
θ¨ = 0
)
= p (x), which in
turn implies P¨
(
θ¨ = 1
)
= 1− p (x).
Example 6. In the various t-tests, θ∗ is the mean of X or a difference in means, and
the statistic t (X; 0) is the absolute value of a statistic with a Student t distribution
of known degrees of freedom. The above formalism then gives the usual two-sided
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p-value from a t-test as P¨
(
θ¨ = 0
)
and p (x). Specials cases of this P¨ have been
presented as fiducial distributions (van Berkum et al. (1996);Bickel, 2011d).
3.3 A blended posterior for testing
This subsection blends the above set P˙ of Bayesian posteriors with the above confi-
dence posterior P¨ as prescribed by Section 2.2. Gathering the results of Sections 3.1
and 3.2,
P˙ =
{
P˙ ∈ P : P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
≥ ϕ (p (x))
}
;
P¨
(
θ¨ = 0
)
= p (x) = 1− P¨
(
θ¨ = 1
)
.
Equation (4) then implies that
P˙
(
P¨
)
=
{
P˙ ∈ P : ϕ (p (x)) ≤ P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
< 1
}
,
in which the first inequality is strict if and only if ϕ (p (x)) = 0 and the second
inequality is strict unless p (x) = 1. Since P˙
(
P¨
)
is convex, Proposition 1 yields
Pˆ (θ = 0) =

ϕ (p (x)) if p (x) < ϕ (p (x))
p (x) if p (x) ≥ ϕ (p (x))
, (11)
where θ is the random variable of distribution Pˆ . With the identities ϕ (p (x)) =
Pr (H0|p (X) = p (x)) and Pˆ (θ = 0) = Pr (H0; p (x)) and with the establishment of
equation (1) by Section 3.1, equation (11) verifies the claim of equation (2) made in
Section 1.2.
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4 Remarks
Remark 1. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the use of Bayes’s theorem with proper
priors need not involve subjective interpretations of probability. The set of posteriors
may be determined by interval constraints on the corresponding priors without any
requirement that they model levels of belief (Weichselberger, 2000; Augustin, 2002,
2004). However, subjective applications of blended inference are also possible. While
the framework was developed with an unknown prior in mind, the concept of imprecise
or indeterminate probability (Walley, 1991) could take the place of the set in which
an unknown prior lies. By allowing the partial order of agent preferences, imprecise
probability theories need not assume the existence of any true prior (Walley, 1991;
Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002). As often happens, the same mathematical framework
is subject to very different philosophical interpretations.
Remark 2. Technically, the principle of maximum entropy (Paris, 1994; Paris and
Vencovská, 1997) mentioned in Section 2.1.1 could be used if Θ is finite or countable
infinite. However, unlike the proposed methodology, that practice is equivalent to
making the benchmark posterior P¨ depend on the function τ˙ that maps a parameter
space to Θ rather than on a method of data analysis that is coherent in the sense
that its posterior depends on the data rather than on the hypothesis. If blending
with such a method is not desired, one may average the Bayesian posteriors with
respect to some measure that is not a function of Θ. For example, averaging with
respect to the Lebesgue measure, as Bickel (2011a) did with confidence posteriors,
leads to
(
1 + ϕ (p (x))
)
/2 as the posterior probability of the null hypothesis under
the assumptions of Section 3.1. Remark 5 discusses a more tenable version of the
maximum entropy principle for blended inference.
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Remark 3. Using definitions of divergence that include information divergence (3)
as a special case, Grünwald and Philip Dawid (2004) and Topsøe (2004) generalized
variations of Proposition 1. The theory of blended inference extends accordingly.
Remark 4. A generalization of Section 2 in a different direction from that of Remark
3 replaces each “ inf P˙∈P˙(P¨)” of equation (5) with “ inf P˙∈P˙ .” For that optimization
problem, Theorem 2 of Topsøe (2007) has the condition that P˙ ∈ P˙ =⇒ I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
<
∞ in addition to the convexity of P˙ that Proposition 1 of the present paper requires.
Thus, in that formulation, the blended posterior Pˆ need not satisfy equation (6) even
if P˙ is convex.
Remark 5. A posterior distribution Pˆ that is defined by
I
(
Pˆ ||P¨
)
= inf
P˙∈P˙
I
(
P˙ ||P¨
)
(12)
satisfies the desiderata of Section 2.3 whether or not the conditions of Proposition
1 hold. While certain axiomatic systems (e.g., Csiszár, 1991) lead to this general-
ization of the principle of maximum entropy (Remark 2), the optimization problem
of equation (5) seems more compelling in this context and defines Pˆ even when no
distribution satisfying equation (12) exists.
Remark 6. In the presence of multiple comparisons, the confidence posteriors of Sec-
tion 3.2.1 may be adjusted to control a family-wise error rate or false coverage rate
(Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005), if desired. Either error rate would then take the
place of the conventional confidence level as the confidence posterior probability.
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